1. Delusions and similar disorders of thought content are not the central focus of this chapter but might be of interest to cognitive psychologists. For instance, the study of development and maintenance of delusions is an area of active research. See Bermudez (2001), Garety and Freeman (1999), Gold and Hohwy (2000), and/or Maher (2002) for debate over whether or not delusions represent products of flawed inferential reasoning.
2. Bleuler is likely also the source of the distinction between thought form and content discussed earlier because he drew the distinction (Bleluer, 1911/1950) between what he labeled "fundamental symptoms," including, but not limited to, the loosening of ideational associations, and "accessory symptoms," including hallucinations and delusions.
3. Working in parallel with Cohen, Braver, and colleagues, Kane and Engle (2002) and their collaborators have proposed a model of information maintenance and behavioral response selection entirely compatible with Cohen, Braver, and colleagues' model. Rather than referring to a context-processing module, however, Kane and Engle (2002) deem the same cognitive mechanism "controlled attention" and survey implications of applying the model to patients with frontal lobe lesions, although this mechanism is certainly relevant to psychosis.
4. In fact, Bleuler (1911/1951, as discussed in Chapman & Chapman, 1973), writing nearly one century ago, argued that formal thought disorder in schizophrenia patients involves a failure to utilize context information to bind ideational elements together in logical sequence. However he blamed this disorder on the breaking of the "associative thread" linking a given goal to the appropriate contextual influence, rather than considering the goal context itself.
5. See Andreasen et al. (1999) for the description of an alternate, circuit-based comparator mechanism.
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